This fall, uranium prices set a record high — $96.50 per pound. But even though the radioactive metal is critical to the nuclear power buildout, rising prices haven’t triggered panic among uranium buyers.

So how are buyers continuing to rely on the supply chain to keep delivering?

In this episode, Shayle speaks with Mike Alkin, founder and chief investment officer at Sachem Cove Partners, to unpack the full nuclear fuel cycle: from mining and yellowcake to conversion, enrichment, and fabrication. Mike explains why uranium mining, specifically, is the ultimate bottleneck in the supply chain. He also makes the case that murky contracting masks the market reality, and breaks down what could happen when America’s 2028 ban on Russian enriched uranium goes into full effect. 

Shayle and Mike also discuss:

• Uranium’s global supply/demand mismatch
• Why buyers have been replacing fuel at just above 50% of its burn rate
• Why production costs at the world’s lowest-cost producer, Kazatomprom, have skyrocketed and triggered global production curtailments.
• Why shifting toward overfeeding will create massive new demand for uranium yellowcake
• The challenges America faces finding new uranium suppliers

Resources

• Catalyst: Building a domestic nuclear fuel supply chain
• Catalyst: The state and future of nuclear waste
• Catalyst: The path to market for new nuclear reactors
• Open Circuit: Inside Meta’s massive nuclear push
• Latitude Media: The Department of Energy’s 2026 playbook

Credits: Hosted by Shayle Kann. Produced and edited by Max Savage Levenson. Original music and engineering by Sean Marquand. Stephen Lacey is our executive editor.

Catalyst is brought to you by GridBeyond. GridBeyond is the world’s leading technology platform for managing distributed and flexible energy resources. Learn more by visiting GridBeyond.com.

Catalyst is brought to you by Antenna Group, the strategic communications and marketing partner behind the biggest names in energy, climate, and infrastructure. For three decades, Antenna has helped breakout companies amplify their stories, build reputation, differentiate from the competition, define new categories and accelerate growth. Learn more at antennagroup.com. 

Catalyst is brought to you by EnergyHub. Peak season puts every grid to the test — and the utilities that pass are the ones that built flexible capacity before they needed it. EnergyHub works with more than 230 utilities to coordinate over 2.6 million DERs and more than 3.6 gigawatts of dispatchable flexibility through a single platform designed to perform when it counts most. See what that looks like at EnergyHub.com. 

Transcript

Shayle Kann: I’m Shayle Kann. I lead early-stage investments at Energy Impact Partners. Welcome to Catalyst.

So, at the end of September, the long-term uranium price was $96.50 a pound. That’s a record, above the previous high of $95 that was set in 2007–2008 at the peak of the last uranium bubble. And I should note, as you will hear soon, those numbers are imperfect.

Nonetheless, we don’t really see a scramble amongst ultimate buyers. They seem to feel that as long as they lock in supply for the 2030s, uranium will be there, as our guest today states.

But will the uranium be there?

First of all, uranium isn’t just one market; it’s a supply chain. There’s mining, conversion, enrichment, fabrication. There are geopolitics involved. Too many of those links run through Russia, Kazakhstan, and China. We have a ban on Russian enriched uranium that is coming in 2028. So the question isn’t just whether there’s enough uranium in the ground; it’s whether the mines are coming online quickly enough, whether we can rebuild the fuel supply chain that has sort of withered through a decade of low prices, and whether we can do so fast enough to fuel the new reactors that we are now promising to build.

Mike Alkin is the founder and CIO of Sachem Cove Partners. We walked through the uranium supply chain link by link, talked about the bottlenecks, the geopolitics, and the pricing.

He’s coming up next.

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Shayle Kann: Mike, welcome.

Mike Alkin: Thank you, Shayle. Pleasure to be here.

Shayle Kann: All right, let’s talk uranium. Let’s start by having you, I guess, walk through the value chain for uranium as it exists today from soup to nuts.

Mike Alkin: Sure. It’s called the nuclear fuel cycle—is what the industry refers to it as. Upstream would be uranium mining, where they pull it out of the ground in a few different methods. It gets processed into something they call yellowcake, which is like a powder. And then that gets processed downstream in a few different stages that takes a couple of years to do, on average.

They take yellowcake, which is a powder form, and that in and of itself can’t enrich anything. So for nuclear power, it needs to be enriched. It comes out of the ground at just 0.7% fissile material, so it’s got to be enriched up to 3 to 5% for nuclear power. If you’re making a bomb, it’s got to go up to 90%, which can take a very long time.

So they pass it along to what’s called the conversion part of the cycle, and there they’re turning that yellowcake into a gas called uranium hexafluoride. And from there, it then gets sent on to an enrichment plant. Enrichment is in the news a lot when you hear about the Iran war—it’s all about enrichment levels. From there, what they’re trying to do is take that gas and spin it through centrifuges that spin at the speed of sound, and they’re trying to get the enrichment levels, like I said, up to 3 to 5%.

And then from there, they pass it downstream even further to a fabrication facility where they form it into pellets. Those pellets are then put into tubes, in layperson’s terms, and then that gets into a reactor. That whole process is 18 to 24 months, depending on availability of capacity.

Shayle Kann: And is the market pretty divided up amongst those stages, or are there vertically integrated players who go all the way from mining to…?

Mike Alkin: Fabulous question. The market is—and we can talk about the opaqueness of the market—really bifurcated not only along geopolitical lines and geographies. For example, 70% of nuclear power is consumed in the West, yet 70% of the supply of uranium comes from the East. And along the lines of conversion and enrichment, you also see that. Where we go to enrichment, which is where the magic happens, if you will, 41% to 42% of that is in Russia. Then you’ve got a little bit more in China, and then you start to break it over into the West. But those are state-owned players that the West is competing against.

In the West, the enrichment capacity, for example, is owned by private companies or the state, in the case of France, through Orano—I should say, not through EDF, but it’s Orano, which is a state-owned company. And then you have a Dutch, English, German consortium that is owned by the state, with a couple of small utilities in Germany, called Urenco. That’s a big enricher in the West, but, again, not public. So it’s very bifurcated geopolitically, geographically, and also by ownership type.

As you go further upstream on the uranium side, Kazatomprom, which is the state-owned entity of Kazakhstan—Kazakhstan produces 41% of all uranium in the world. And of that, about half comes from Kazatomprom, the state-owned entity, which is 75% owned by the sovereign wealth fund. Then you get to Uzbekistan; Uzbekistan could produce 8 to 10% of uranium. Then you start to get to Russia, which is another mid to high single digits, sometimes low double digits on uranium. China produces low double digits as you start to get into China itself, which has very little indigenous uranium, but in Namibia, they have significant production capabilities.

So Eastern influences have a significant amount of uranium production versus the West, as I said earlier, with 70 to 30%.

Shayle Kann: And then we think historically, has there been—I mean, is this a market that has seen fairly stable pricing and supply and demand? Is this a market that sees big spikes and big crashes? What does the market look like historically?

Mike Alkin: Most of the time, it’s in a bear market, if you will. If you go back to the 1940s when they started producing uranium and you look at today, there’s been a lot more uranium produced than there has been consumed. But those inventories have been worked off through that lengthy period of time. And the reason I mentioned it’s been more of a bear market than not is you’ve had a couple of incidents: in 1976, you had Three Mile Island; then we know we had Chernobyl in the ’80s; and then in 2011, you had Fukushima.

Each time you’ve had a meltdown, where—and we’ll talk about the safety of nuclear power—with all that you’ve heard, you’ve had very little deaths. Per terawatt-hour, it’s the safest form of electricity generation. But psychologically, it has a lingering effect. So after each one of those, you tend to see demand start to—whatever the plans were, demand starts to pull back, supply works its way into the market, and it depresses prices.

To give your audience a sense of where pricing has come from, if you think about the 1990s and 2000s, the price of uranium was hovering around $7, $8, $9 per pound—that’s how it’s sold, per pound of uranium. It was sitting there for quite some time. Then starting in 2000, it started to work its way up to $8, and $9, and $10, $11, and $12. By the early 2000 aughts, it started to get into the teens and twenties, because even though a lot of it is state-owned, you still have to deal with the Western producers who need an economic incentive to produce this stuff, because the East can’t produce it all.

It started climbing in the twenties and thirties, and then there were some new mines scheduled to come online around 2005, ’06, ’07. You had some hiccups there, one major hiccup, to where supply looked like it was becoming delayed. And for context, the price of uranium went to $137 a pound. So you had this massive boom up.

Now, interestingly, what winds up happening in this market, because it is so opaque, there’s no real electronic price. It’s not like gold or copper, where you can see this thing trading in real time. It’s really done through the cover of darkness. The spot price is reported once per day at 2:45 p.m. Eastern Time, and it’s the midpoint of a bid and the ask that price reporters go around and do surveys on.

Long-term contracting, which is the vast majority—up to 80% of all uranium sold is done under long-term contracts—that price is reported once per month. And that price that’s reported is really not where the market is trading, and we could get further into that.

So you had that big boom. Over the period of 2000 through 2007, prices went from high single digits up to $137 a pound. And then it started to settle in. And the reason it went from—it probably went from 50 to 137 from ’05, ’06, ’07 as there was a big mine coming online, the mine flooded, and people got nervous.

Who are the people when I say that? Those are nuclear fuel buyers. Almost all uranium that’s consumed—almost all—is consumed by nuclear power plants that generate electricity. And because there’s no substitute for uranium—it’s not like you’re a utility and you have a coal plant and a gas plant, and depending on economics, you could ramp one up and shut one down; there is no substitute for uranium in a nuclear power plant. Because of that, security of supply becomes paramount. And therefore, those purchases are done under very long-term contracts—they could be 5, 10, 12 years or longer, because it takes so long and it takes a couple of years to order, so that’s how you tend to see it.

As those contracts ebb and flow, but because security of supply is paramount, and because the cost of uranium is de minimis versus the operating cost of a reactor—for instance, the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, which is what we talked about: mining, conversion, enrichment, fabrication, that could be 20 to 25% of the operating cost. Uranium of that could be 35, 40%. So now you’re talking, let’s say high singles, low double digits of the cost to operate the plant is the uranium itself. Now if I’m running a gas-fired power plant or a coal plant, those costs could be 80 to 90%.

So the feedstock itself, uranium, is a much smaller cost. There is no substitute, so security of supply becomes paramount. But what winds up happening with that, since most uranium is purchased under long-term contracts, is a recency bias and a complacency seeps into the market. And if you live in the nuclear fuel cycle like I do, what you often will hear is, “Well, the uranium fairy always delivers uranium.”

Now pricing has gone from a low of $17 in November of ’16 to well over $100 today, and the psychology of the nuclear fuel buyers, despite prices being up 5x on what they’re paying, is still like, “Ah, there’s plenty of uranium out there.” And it’s really driven by the opaqueness of the market and the recency biases that are in the market, and the fact that security of supply covers them for most of their needs most of the time, they feel.

Shayle Kann: There are two questions that arise for me. The first one being, given the structure of the market, like if I’m a nuclear power plant operator, I have pretty good visibility into my fuel requirements. I’m going to be operating close to 100% capacity factor, I know what I’m going to need, and, as you said, the only thing that really matters to me is security of supply, not necessarily pricing. Why is there a spot market at all? Why don’t I just entirely contract forward all of my required capacity?

Mike Alkin: It’s a fabulous question. If we look at the composition of the spot market, you’re probably looking at 50, 60, 65%, depending on the year, are physical traders. And what those traders tend to do—some of the Japanese trading houses, some of the banks will do it, some one-off random traders will come into the market. You’re starting to see some of the big oil and gas traders come into the market, some of the mammoth ones. You’ve seen Mercuria enter the market recently, which is enormous.

What they do is they might have helped start finance a small development mine, and they might get some offtake. Or the Uzbeks, or the Kazakhs, or Olympic Dam, which is owned by BHP down in South Australia—a monster copper mine where one of the byproducts is uranium. They produce 7, 8, 9, 10 million pounds a year in a market that’s, let’s round up, 200 million pounds, and demand growing mid-single digits to contextualize Olympic Dam. They may take that and just put it into the spot market if it doesn’t have a committed home, let’s say, with a utility. Because it’s such a small portion of what they produce, and not that big a portion of the market, they can’t be bothered; they might just sell it.

Those traders will take it. So that activity occurs for the 20% to 25% of the market that is the spot market, more than half of that are these traders, and they’re trading back and forth for $1.00 a pound, $0.50 a pound, trying to get what they can get.

Now, because the spot price—and you asked such a great question about why even have it—is the only one that’s reported daily, and, again, it’s not electronic, it’s a quiet, over-the-counter market, it’s the only one people look at.

And so if we then look at who else trades uranium, well, over time what’s happened is Cameco, for example, the largest Western uranium miner—for context, they still produce 22 to 24 million pounds a year in that market—they’re a behemoth. What they will do, they might sell 30 to 32 million pounds a year. Why did they do that? Because they’re keeping a bid in the market. So they’ll oversell their contract book, but because there’s such illiquidity in the market, they’re in there buying.

And some other producers who might have production problems will be in the market, so that could be 15 to 20% of the market. That last 15% or so historically are other financials that are in there just trying to poke around, or utilities.

Now, a utility typically doesn’t buy in the spot market because it takes them a couple of years. If they’re buying in the spot market today, they really have a problem, because they can’t get that processed anyway.

So why have a spot market? It’s really just because there are some financial creatures in there looking to close an arbitrage once in a while. Some of them have helped finance mines and their reward is to get offtake and trade back and forth. But even for the bigger Japanese trading houses, these are not big businesses for them, because the market itself isn’t that big.

Where real price discovery occurs is in the contract market. The contract market, though, can provide a lot of misdirection if one really doesn’t focus on the nuances of it. If we say 80% of the market is a contract market, the price that gets reported each month is what’s called the base-escalated—the term price is what they’ll call it. The way price reporters define that, it’s the lowest offer they could find on a contract.

If 80% of the market is long-term contracts, 70% of that is not that. A smaller portion, 25 to 30% of that market, is base-escalated, where a utility will go to a producer—and you tend to see it in a bear market for pricing—a utility goes and says, “We would like a 5-year contract,” to make up the tenor. “We’d like a 5-year contract for a million pounds a year, and we’re going to pay the long-term quoted price today, base-escalated.” It might be 3% a year, and it technically gets delivered in the third year onward. That’s a base-escalated price.

The price reporters, of which there are two big ones, will report that price. The vast majority of the pounds that are sold are not sold that way. That base-escalated contract typically might occur through a request for proposal. Constellation or Duke might send out to the market, “We need a 5-year contract for 1 million pounds per year.” A number of producers might put in and bid on that.

Let’s pick a number: it’s $90 per pound. Today it’s quoted at 97. But let’s say Duke or Constellation contracted at $102 a pound, or $103 a pound. Why? Because they didn’t want to go down to a smaller developer that might have been offering a lower price. Geographically, they might have had limitations. If the price was struck at $102 or $103 or $105 per pound, but there was an offer on that contract at 97—somebody bid $97…

Shayle Kann: They report 97.

Mike Alkin: That’s what they report. That’s like you selling a million-dollar home and somebody offered you 800, and it gets reported at 800. It’s not what happened.

So you have a minority portion of the market that is sold under these base-escalated contracts, and the price reporting on that is done in a manner that’s odd at best. Where the market really occurs is bilaterally negotiated. “Off-market” is the term—it’s just not put out to RFP.

And, by the way, nuclear fuel buyers are nuclear engineers; they’re not traders. These are not folks trading coal and gas who are commercial creatures. The economic incentive to a nuclear power plant buyer is not buy low, sell high. It’s: don’t run out of fuel—that keeps your job—and keep our plants running safely. As a result, there’s not an economic incentive to call bottoms.

Where the contract really occurs is, “Hey, we’re going to call you; we’re not going to put out an RFP into the market.” The fuel buyers are savvy enough to know if they put an RFP in the market, they’re going to get small developers who need a contract win, who might come in and set the bar low. And the fuel buyers did that through ’21 and ’22 and ’23. As prices were going up, the way they could do that is get that desperate little developer who probably has no chance of producing uranium, but they’ll give it the old college try. And because they come in lower than what the bigger producers will come in at, they know the price reporters will set that price low.

Now, that’s in a buyer’s market. Now you’re in a seller’s market, and the opposite is happening.

Shayle Kann: Let me take a step back for a second. You mentioned that the buyers’ attitude right now, even at prices that are up 5x and over 100 bucks a pound, is like, “There’s enough uranium.” Is there enough uranium?

Mike Alkin: No. Just for background, I have 30 years in the hedge fund business looking deeply at out-of-favor industries. In 2016, one of the industries I started looking at—managing my own money after the firm I was at turned into a family office—was uranium. I started going to nuclear power conferences, and nobody was there. Wall Street was not there. Industry prices had collapsed 95%. The equities were down 95%. If you looked for a model from the sell side, from a Goldman or anyone, they hadn’t had a model in years, so it was abandoned.

When you started talking to those fuel buyers at these conferences and said, “Hey, I’m learning about the nuclear industry,” they’d say, “You’re wasting your time. Pricing is $17, $18, $20; it’s going to 10, it’s going to 5.”

I spent the next two years—to shortcut it—building a model of every reactor on the planet and every mine on the planet. And the reality was at $17, $18, $19, once those contracts expired, to extract the price of uranium out of the ground back then had to be well over 50 bucks a pound. So I knew the math was not right.

What wound up happening over the last several years: there’s a number that we look at called replacement rate contracting. If the industry consumes 200 million pounds a year—it was 175 when I started looking at it, it’s gone up to 200—are they contracting at that same rate? Because if they’re not, they’re drawing down inventories.

When you look at the amount of inventory that has been drawn down over the last decade, it’s been a staggering amount. The recency biases of people who were trading off of prior years’ contracts in a market where pricing had collapsed made them just always believe that uranium would be there.

Here we are, fast-forward. Over the last decade, the replacement rate of contracting is about 55%. So for every pound a utility consumes, they’re replacing a little bit more than half of that. Therefore, you’re not testing the economic viability of the uranium production complex in the world.

Yet prices have still risen from the high teens to over $100 per pound. And that’s without stressing the market, without stressing supply, because the supply that they believe is always there isn’t economically viable.

To put something in context, Shayle: Kazatomprom, the state-owned entity, is the largest in the world. Kazakhstan itself produces 41%, and through a series of JVs with Russia, China, the Canadians, and the French, they produce half of it with those JVs and half for themselves. They came public around 2018–2019, and they put out a very thorough 700-plus-page prospectus. They are by far the lowest cost producer in the world. In that prospectus, they looked out going through 2040, and their all-in sustaining cost of production was in the mid-teens then. They said by the time we get to the mid-20s, looking at 2025, it was going to be around $13 to $14 a pound, and they were using a tenge of 340 tenge to the dollar. They cost in tenge and sell in dollars, so a weakening tenge helps their profitability.

Fast-forward to 2025 and early ’26: the cost to produce that same pound is not $13 to $14; it’s $40. And on a constant currency basis, because the tenge has weakened so much, it’s $55. So their costs have gone absolutely parabolic. The price of uranium has risen, but not nearly as much as needed to offset the rise in costs.

So you’ve seen production curtailments. Over the years, you’ve seen curtailments come, why? Because the Kazakhs realized, “We don’t need to produce like the old Soviet style: you’re losing money, produce more.” They’ve cut back production quite a bit, as you’ve seen production cuts across the entire complex.

You asked the question, “Is there enough uranium?” There is not enough economically viable uranium. That horse has left the barn. The utilities waited too long to incentivize new production. Over the past decade and a half, since 2011 when Fukushima happened and all this excess supply hit the market because demand had weakened—well, that was 15 years ago. Inventories have been sucked down, driven by the recency biases that the uranium fairy will always deliver uranium. As they’ve gone in and tested the economic viability of production capacity at only half the clip of replacing what they’re using, prices have gone up 5x. They’re hoping beyond hope that new mines will come online. And there are new mines coming online; that still doesn’t cover them.

Shayle Kann: Is your view, then, that the bottleneck, the reason there isn’t enough uranium, is upstream—it’s mining? It’s not that there is insufficient conversion or enrichment capacity?

Mike Alkin: It’s a really good question. One of the narratives you’ll hear is, “Well, conversion is a bottleneck, and enrichment is a bottleneck.” But price is the great elixir, right? Right now, if you think about this whole fuel cycle, there is one product, and that’s uranium. Everything else is a service. Converting it is a service, enriching it is a service, fabricating it is a service.

When we look at conversion, the price has gone from $4 per kilogram to $60 per kilogram. That has incentivized new capacity to come online. There is still more capacity needed, but that’s the flick of a switch. That is signing long-term contracts. Cameco and others could bring Metropolis—which is a Honeywell spin-out owned by Solstice at Metropolis, Illinois—they could bring it on; price will do that, and in a few years, you’ll have the equipment and you can build that productive capacity.

Same thing with enrichment. Enrichment went from $35 per separative work unit up to 200. Well, that incentivized capacity is coming online. Urenco, Orano, they’re bringing capacity online. It’s coming in early 2030, 2031.

A uranium mine, from discovery to production, can take 20 to 25 years. And if you look at where these things are built, the big-scale ones—a lot of it is junior mining. These are small, tiny companies running around saying, “Look at me, we have the lowest costs in the world.” No, you don’t. What you’ll see right now, if you read many of the decks out there, they’ll say, “We have $40 costs.” Well, the world’s lowest-cost uranium miner now has $40 costs; you don’t have $40 costs.

As you’re thinking about a uranium mine, the bottleneck is going to be—there are inventories around the world, but as prices rise, inventories become dearer; they don’t become more mobile.

There’s one other element in the fuel cycle that makes the ability to add up to 20% more uranium than is actually needed—it could be a little bit more—where it will create demand, and that’s in the enrichment process.

There’s something called underfeeding, which is, without getting into the nuances and boring people to death, the way that centrifuges spin: if there’s too much productive capacity—if you think about an apple press, if I had an apple press and wanted to make a gallon of apple juice, think about a centrifuge that way. I would throw a bushel of apples in and do what I’m doing and get a gallon. If I had no other order coming behind me, I could keep that press spinning and probably get a gallon and a quart, gallon and a pint, but I would have more.

When there’s not enough enrichment demand, those centrifuges are spinning; they can’t be shut down once they get turned on. Electricity is about 5% of the cost of production, so there’s very little cost to produce. When they have excess capacity like they did during a downturn after Fukushima, they take the uranium that’s spinning, make enough for the utility’s order, and then whatever they can extract for themselves, they keep and sell into the market. That’s called underfeeding. That’s a nuance of the enrichment portion of it.

Conversely, if you didn’t have enough enrichment capacity and there was demand on that capacity, what you could do is add more apples to that apple press if you needed an extra quart, but you couldn’t run it for the full amount of time. You needed to run it less time because there was so much demand and you had to keep churning, so you would put in more uranium.

Where you are in the cycle right now is you’ve gone from uranium underfeeding—and at one point in time, Shayle, the amount of uranium being produced in a bear market through underfeeding was the equivalent of the world’s largest uranium mine. There was an extra 20 million pounds of uranium being produced at enrichment plants that was being sold into the market. It was almost pure margin for the enrichers.

Fast-forward to where there’s not enough enrichment capacity right now. You’re getting to the point where it’s close to them needing to overfeed those centrifuges. You’re not there yet, but you can pencil it out and see that they’re going to need to rush out and buy more uranium on limited capacity. That puts an extra buyer of uranium into the market. They can extract 15 to 20% more uranium, but that’s going to put even more demand on the uranium itself. And then you start to get utilities needing to buy because demand has grown. When I started my vehicle…

Shayle Kann: Let me ask you though, as a final question, about the geopolitics a little bit, which you alluded to, but we haven’t really talked about directly. I know there’s a ban coming on Russian imports of enriched uranium into the U.S. How important is that?

Mike Alkin: It’s important. Right now, the Russians—they send in enriched uranium; we send them back U3O8 feed. We’ve sent hardly any back recently, only a little bit.

People tend to think, for example, “Oh, the war might end with Ukraine, and the Russians are going to send a lot of uranium in.” The Russians don’t have enough uranium, because they have two needs for it. One is their own reactor fleet in Russia, and then they have an export business where they build reactors across the Belt and Road. They build them, they help finance them, they help operate them, and they supply the uranium to them. There’s not enough uranium for them, so they need uranium.

Now, they sell enriched uranium to the United States. If the Russian ban went away, psychologically people would say, “Okay, the Russians are going to flood the market.” They’re not going to flood the market with uranium, because they don’t have enough uranium. There would be enriched uranium, but enriched prices have already gone up, contracts are being signed, and that will do what it’s going to do.

Congress passed it, it’s signed, the ban is for ’28, and that is what it is. So we’re focused on the U3O8 portion of it, understanding: does Russia have enough uranium itself for enrichment? They’re scrambling to get uranium for it. Now, they also can underfeed their centrifuges, which they do, but it’s a challenge for them.

Shayle Kann: All right, Mike, this was super informative. Thank you so much.

Mike Alkin: You’re welcome.

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